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 The Japanese Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, marked the beginning of 
total war between the United States and Japan. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, giving the military broad abilities to 
exclude any person(s) from prescribed military areas. Less than one week later, U.S. 
Army Lieutenant General John DeWitt began the process of removing Japanese 
Americans from their West Coast homes. Within four months of the Executive Order, the 
United States government forced over 100,000 Japanese Americans to abandon their lives 
and relocate to internment camps.  
Fred Korematsu, a twenty-three-year-old, natural-born American citizen, was 
arrested and jailed on May 30, 1942, for refusing to relocate to an assembly center. 
Arguing that the Executive Order violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
rights, Korematsu appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court, which 
ultimately affirmed his conviction in a 6-3 decision. The Supreme Court limited the 
Korematsu decision to its facts, thus giving it no precedential value and failing to 
establish a practicable standard for future cases where wartime military actions are 
challenged. This examination of the Korematsu case will bring further understanding to 
the historical background surrounding the high court’s decision, as well as the legal and 
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Chapter I  
“Citizenship has its responsibilities, as well as its privileges, and, in time of 
war, the burden is always heavier”  




One hundred years prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Asian immigration to 
the United States began to increase as major industries like farming and railroad 
construction expanded rapidly. In the mid 19th century, significant numbers of Chinese 
immigrants flooded into the United States, fleeing violent conflicts such as the Opium 
Wars, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Red Turban uprisings (Japanese American Citizens 
League, 2006). While many Chinese immigrants travelled to California in search of gold, 
others moved further inland to work on farms and railroads. Unfortunately, it was not 
long before the Chinese began to experience coercive, blatant racism in the United States. 
In 1852, shortly after gold was first discovered in California, the state legislature passed 
the Foreign Miner’s License Tax. This required non-citizen miners to pay an extra 
monthly fee simply to access the gold mines. Chinese immigrants, prohibited from 
becoming American citizens under the Naturalization Act of 1790, found it impossible to 
avoid the Foreign Miner’s Tax.  
Meanwhile, the Central Pacific Railroad company heavily recruited Chinese 
immigrants, who “proved to be just as hardworking as whites and accepted less pay” 
(Japanese American Citizens League, 2006). By 1867, Chinese men accounted for over 
90% of Central Pacific Railroad’s workforce. Despite their hard work that made the 
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transcontinental railroad possible, Chinese men faced brutal work conditions for paltry 
compensation.  
On Cape Horn, a particularly notorious rock outcrop in the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains near Colfax, California, workers were lowered down the cliff 
face in a wicker basket to drill holes in a solid granite wall and then stuff 
them with dynamite. Those unlucky enough not to be pulled up before the 
dynamite exploded, perished. Many Chinese also died from harsh weather 
conditions. For their work, including those handling explosives, they 
received a flat salary below that of all white workers. In 1869, when tracks 
from east and west were joined at Promontory Point, Utah, no Chinese were 
allowed to attend the ceremony (Japanese American Citizens League, 
2006).  
 After railroad construction was completed and the gold rush died down, Chinese 
immigrants found work in factories, and started businesses such as laundromats and 
grocery stores (Japanese American Citizens League, 2006).  Public hatred for Chinese 
Americans grew as many were in direct competition with whites for jobs and business 
revenue. In the Chinese Massacre of 1871, a mob of over five hundred people overtook 
Chinatown in Los Angeles (Wallace, 2017). Eighteen Chinese men and boys were 
lynched in a racist frenzy. Their bodies were laid on the jailhouse lawn the next morning. 
Although it is still considered one of the worst mass lynchings in American history, the 
Chinese Massacre of 1871 was quickly forgotten and is widely unknown today.  
President Chester A. Arthur signed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. It was the 
first law to ever exclude an entire ethnic group from immigrating to the United States 
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(African American Policy Forum). The Act not only barred new Chinese immigrants 
from coming to the country—it also prohibited Chinese nationals from becoming 
citizens. The Chinese Exclusion Act was extremely popular amongst the American 
public. Worker’s groups and unions warned that the Chinese were taking the jobs of 
white men by undercutting wages (Woolf, 2015). Anti-Asian racism was not only 
widespread, but also commonplace in the United States far prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.  
The Supreme Court also has a long history of prejudicial attitudes towards Asians. 
The Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896 upheld racial segregation through the “separate 
but equal” principle. In Justice Harlan’s dissent, he wrote: “There is a race so different 
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United 
States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our 
country. I allude to the Chinese race” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896) (African American 
Policy Forum).  
Japanese Immigration 
 
 Many 19th century American companies still had high demand for cheap and 
plentiful labor, despite the ban on Chinese immigration. This demand created an influx of 
immigration from another Asian nation (Japanese American Citizens League, 2006). In 
Japan, the radical Meiji imperial government imposed tremendous taxes on Japanese 
farmers to finance the island nation’s rapid transformation into a modern country with 
newly open borders. Although many Japanese were skilled farmers, the new policies 
made it nearly impossible for the majority of Japanese farmers to attain financial stability. 
Tens of thousands immigrated to Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States 
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throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although a great deal of business and 
landowners were initially happy to welcome the Japanese to work for long hours in return 
for low wages, hostility towards Japanese immigrants quickly started emerging.  
During the early 20th century, Japanese American communities were becoming 
larger and more prosperous. By 1919, Japanese farmers owned 74,769 acres of land in 
California alone (Oppenheimer, Prakash, & Burns, 2016). The Japanese were seen as a 
growing threat to the American economy and way of life. In 1905, the San Francisco 
Chronicle (the most influential newspaper on the West Coast) published a front-page 
article titled “THE JAPANESE INVASION, THE PROBLEM OF THE HOUR” 
(Oppenheimer, et. al., 2016). Workers groups and farming communities led some of the 
most extreme movements to exclude Japanese Americans from public life. “In 1905, 
California trade unionists formed the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, which 
existed solely to exclude Japanese and other Asian peoples” (Oppenheimer, et. al., 2016). 
The racist attitudes of the general public which were once directed at the Chinese had 
simply shifted to target the Japanese.  The Immigration Act of 1924 effectively ended all 
immigration from Japan and, like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, prevented Japanese 





“To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the 
real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue”  
(Majority opinion, Korematsu v. United States, 1944).  
The Outbreak of War 
 
Japan’s 1937 invasion of China and Germany’s 1939 invasion of Poland led to 
World War II. The Japanese invasion of China frightened world leaders as word of the 
atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army spread throughout the world. In 
early December 1937, the Japanese captured the Chinese city of Nanking (“Rape of 
Nanking”, 2017). Despite the immediate surrender of the Chinese military in Nanking, 
the Japanese Imperial Army carried out a six-week raid on the city. At least 200,000 
Chinese women were raped, (other sources cite numbers as high as 800,000), and 
approximately 300,000 people were killed (“Rape of Nanking”, 2017). Although 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt vowed to keep the United States out of foreign wars, 
Japan’s acquisition of territory in China and Southeast Asia created an alarming reality 
for the rest of the world. Pressure grew for the United States to aid the allied powers until 
it officially joined the conflict following the attack on Pearl Harbor.  
When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, a sense of shock and 
hysteria surged through the United States. American musicologist Alan Lomax took to 
the streets the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor to discuss the public’s perspective 
on the attack. One man called the attack on Pearl Harbor “very uncalled for”, and another 
expressed his bewilderment by saying: “How [the Japanese] could have approached so 
close to our great naval base without being discovered by our patrol airplanes is beyond 
my understanding” (LoProto, 2018). Although the possibility of war was looming, the 
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United States military was dramatically underprepared for the attack. As James Michener 
noted, the Japanese Americans residing on the West Coast were an easy scapegoat 
(Snyder, 2009). “One way to save face was to explain the disaster at Pearl Harbor was the 
result of espionage by Japanese living in Hawaii and along our West Coast” (Weglyn & 
Michener, 1996).  
As the terror of World War II reached the United States, Japanese Americans 
began to fear the worst for their futures. Japanese American Akiko Kurose reported that 
she suddenly became aware of what was to come when she went to school the day after 
Pearl Harbor. “When I went back to school that following morning, December 8th, one of 
my teachers said, ‘You people bombed Pearl Harbor’” (Akiko Kurose oral history 
interview, 1997). Japanese Americans throughout the West Coast began to experience 
overt racial prejudice. Aiko Yoshinaga was a high school senior in California when Pearl 
Harbor was attacked. The principal of her school refused to issue diplomas to Aiko and 
the other Japanese American students that spring (Ellis & Smith, 2018). “To be deprived 
of that diploma was a big blow to us. It was proof that the feeling we had been carrying 
all the time, sort of a self-hatred for not being white, showed its ugly head at that time” 
(Ellis & Smith, 2018).  
In his Congressional Address requesting a declaration of war with Japan, 
President Roosevelt proclaimed: “No matter how long it may take us to overcome this 
premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to 
absolute victory” (Roosevelt, 1941). When the United States officially entered the war, it 
did so by demanding unconditional surrender from the Axis powers. Although the Allied 
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powers prevailed within less than five years, one ill-fated group of Americans lost 
everything.   
Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt’s top military 
officials recommended the removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Military 
and intelligence advisors claimed it was impossible to distinguish loyal and disloyal 
Japanese Americans (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library & Museum, 2016). On February 19, 
1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. This order gave the military 
broad abilities to “prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the 
appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be 
excluded” (Exec. Order 9066, 1942). Although the Executive Order did not provide for 
detention, Congress passed Public Law 77-503 shortly after the issuance of Order 9066 
(Japanese American Citizens League, 2011). This act authorized the imposition of prison 
time and fines for any person found guilty of violating a military order (JACL, 2011). 
Public Law 77-503 effectively allowed federal courts to enforce the provisions of 
Executive Order 9066 (Niiya, 2013).  
Like most other executive orders, Order 9066 was authored by a variety of 
presidential advisors and intelligence officials. President Roosevelt’s advisors strongly 
believed that the removal of the Japanese from the West Coast was a military necessity. 
Budget Director Harold D. Smith asked President Roosevelt to review and sign a draft of 
what would become Order 9066: 
Mr. James H. Rowe, on the part of the Department of Justice, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Karl R. Bendetson, on the part of the War Department, have 
presented the attached draft of Executive Order directing the Secretary of 
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War or any designated Military Commander to prescribe military areas from 
which any or all persons may be excluded (personal communication, 
February 19 1942). 
Axis Sympathizers  
 
Because no specific race was mentioned in Executive Order 9066, many assumed 
that German, Italian, and Japanese immigrants would all be equally affected. The United 
States government had been investigating the loyalty of German immigrants in particular, 
and detained hundreds prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor under suspicion of Nazi and 
Communist affiliation (Rosenfield, 2015). Within twenty-four hours of the Pearl Harbor 
attack, 106 ethnic Germans and Italians were arrested in Hawaii for suspected espionage 
(Rosenfield, 2015). Thousands of German and Italian descendants were apprehended and 
detained without cause following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and there were calls to 
imprison or deport all German and Italian nationals (Rosenfield, 2015). 
By 1941, over one million people living in the United States had been born in 
Germany, and an additional five million had German-born parents (Rosenfield, 2015). 
The United States was also home to a great deal of Italian descendants, with over two 
million immigrating to the U.S. between 1901 and 1920 alone (Rosenfield, 2015). In 
1941, the two largest foreign-born populations in the United States were Germans and 
Italians (Rosenfield, 2015). The sheer number of Germans and Italians living in the 
United States during World War II made the idea of complete internment out of the 
question. Instead, the United States government used a series of factors to determine the 
loyalty of a German or Italian individual. The FBI monitored membership in suspicious 
organizations, recent travel to Axis countries, bank accounts, magazine and newspaper 
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subscriptions, and a variety of other data points to determine whether or not to arrest a 
person of German or Italian descent (Rosenfield, 2017). In all, approximately 3,000 
Italians and 11,000 Germans were interned in the United States during World War II 
(Associated Press, 2007).  
Although approximately 14,000 were interned, Germans and Italians were 
individually investigated and vetted, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, to determine their 
loyalty to the United States. Japanese Americans were not. There was no reason to 
believe that Japanese Americans were less loyal to the United States or more likely to 
engage in espionage than their German and Italian counterparts. Several investigations 
concluded that the Japanese Americans living on the West Coast did not pose a security 
risk. The Munson Report of 1941 was ordered by President Roosevelt and conducted by 
investigator Curtis B. Munson (Niiya, 2014).  Munson and a team of investigators spent 
three weeks interviewing Japanese Americans on the West Coast and meeting with local 
offices of Naval Intelligence (Niiya, 2014). Ultimately, Munson determined that Japanese 
Americans “Possessed a remarkable, even extraordinary degree of loyalty” to the United 
States, and that many were “Not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan” 
(Niiya, 2014). The findings of the Munson report were substantiated by several years of 
investigation conducted by the FBI (Japanese American Citizens League, 2011).  
However, in spite of conclusions like those of the Munson Report, Japanese 
Americans as a whole were seen as eternally loyal to the Japanese Empire—and therefore 
undeserving of further investigation. President Roosevelt’s top intelligence advisors 
claimed it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans. 
Lieutenant General John DeWitt stated: “[t]here isn't such a thing as a loyal Japanese and 
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it is just impossible to determine their loyalty by investigation—it just can't be done” 
(Niiya, 2015). These views were also shared by a great deal of the American public. A 
1943 opinion poll showed that 62% of Americans believed that: “The Japanese people 
will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible” (National 
Opinion Research Center, 1946).  
However, not all of Roosevelt’s advisors supported Japanese internment (Ellis & 
Smith, 2018). Attorney General Francis Biddle and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
reportedly advised President Roosevelt that the security of the West Coast could be 
adequately ensured by arresting suspicious individuals and maintaining heightened 
security in vulnerable areas (Ellis & Smith, 2018). Although Attorney General Biddle 
advised against excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast, Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson allegedly convinced Roosevelt that internment was the only way to 
protect the West Coast from invasion (Ellis & Smith, 2018). 
In 1943, Lieutenant General John DeWitt submitted a Final Report on the 
Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, justifying his rationale for recommending the 
complete removal of Japanese Americans from the Pacific Coast. DeWitt described them 
as a “tightly-knit racial group” whose communities were “virtually always adjacent to 
very vital shore installations, war plants, etc.” (Western Defense Command and Fourth 
Army [WDC], 1943). The report stated that numerous “Emperor worshipping 
ceremonies” had taken place within Japanese American communities (WDC, 1943). 
DeWitt described the increasing numbers of Japanese language schools on the West 
Coast, and also suggested that many American-born Japanese descendants were being 
sent back to Japan for “education and indoctrination” (WDC, 1943). Ultimately, DeWitt 
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concluded that a variety of suspicious incidents necessitated the complete removal of 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast, despite the lack of reliable evidence to 
substantiate his claims.  
Evacuation  
 
Lieutenant General John DeWitt issued four public proclamations following 
Executive Order 9066. The first proclamation “divided Washington, Oregon, California, 
and Arizona into two military areas, numbered 1 and 2” (National Parks Service, 2016). 
An accompanying press release explained that persons of Japanese descent would be 
removed from areas 1 and 2 at a later date. Several thousand Japanese Americans living 
in military areas one and two willingly relocated, knowing that if they remained, they 
would likely be removed by force. Approximately 10,000 Japanese Americans moved out 
from the West Coast area and relocated to Wyoming, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Idaho. 
(JACL, 2011). However, the governors of these states protested vehemently once influxes 
of Japanese Americans began arriving (Ellis & Smith, 2018). They called for tightened 
security measures and the long-term detention of Japanese Americans. Wyoming 
Governor Nels Smith proclaimed that his state would not “stand for being California’s 
dumping ground”, while Idaho Attorney General Bert Miller insisted that “all Japanese 
be put in concentration camps, for the remainder of the war… We want to keep this a 
white man’s country” (Niiya, 2015).  
Lieutenant General John DeWitt advised President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff that 
removing Japanese Americans from the West Coast was a necessity to prevent an attack 
on the U.S. mainland (Ex parte Endo, 1944). Early evacuation proposals suggested the 
compulsory evacuation of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast into neighboring 
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states of Wyoming, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Idaho (called “inter-mountain states”). 
According to John DeWitt, mass incarceration was not a necessity to protect the West 
Coast from invasion. If Japanese Americans were to disperse into the interior of the 
country, the danger of a mainland invasion would be greatly diminished. However, the 
governors of the inter-mountain states refused to accept mass numbers of unsupervised 
Japanese Americans (Ex parte Endo, 1944). John DeWitt reported: “The evacuation 
program necessarily and ultimately developed into one of complete Federal supervision 
was due primarily to the fact that the interior states would not accept an uncontrolled 
Japanese migration” (Ex parte Endo, 1944).  
DeWitt’s second public proclamation established four additional military areas in 
the states of Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah (National Parks Service, 2016). DeWitt 
allegedly planned to remove all Japanese Americans from these areas as well, although 
this plan was never executed (National Parks Service, 2016).  
Proclamation number three placed a curfew on ‘all enemy aliens and persons of 
Japanese ancestry’ in Military area one (National Parks Service, 2016). Under the curfew, 
Japanese Americans were required to stay in their homes between 8:00 pm and 6:00 am. 
Gordon Hirabayashi challenged the curfew in the 1943 Supreme Court case Hirabayashi 
v. United States. The Court unanimously upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction.  
Finally, proclamation number four prohibited remaining Japanese Americans in 
Military area one from leaving prior to removal. The military then began issuing 
mandatory evacuation orders, beginning on March 24, 1942 near Seattle (National Parks 
Service, 2016). The United States army issued a total of 108 Civilian Exclusion Orders, 
which were signs posted in West Coast communities notifying “all Japanese persons, 
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both alien and nonalien”- that they had six days to pack the possessions that they could 
carry and report to assembly centers near their homes (National Parks Service, 2016) 
(JACL, 2011).  
Throughout their West Coast communities, Japanese American families 
scrambled to pack their most precious belongings and sell the rest of their possessions. 
Because they were told only to bring what they could carry, families left behind precious 
heirlooms, furniture, appliances, family businesses, automobiles, and much more. One 
Japanese American individual recalled his father, a grocery store owner, selling the store, 
equipment, and inventory for $400—equal to about $7,000 today (Ellis & Smith, 2018). 
While Japanese parents hurried to sell their possessions for what little they could, 
children grappled with the idea that they would soon leave their lives behind. With so 
little room available in suitcases and bags, few children were able to pack toys or favorite 
items. Crops and farm animals were left to fend for themselves. Family pets were also 
left behind.  
Since they had no concept of when or if they would be able to return to their 
homes, and no idea where they would be sent, families struggled to decide what type of 
clothing to pack. The military provided little information to Japanese American families 
when the evacuation orders were issued. One Japanese woman recalled wondering, “It 
was hard to decide—do we take summer clothes, winter clothes, sneakers, boots? I found 
that the things I selected were totally inadequate for the weather that we finally did 
encounter” (Ellis & Smith, 2018). Some recalled wearing multiple garments to the 
assembly centers in an attempt to bring additional clothing. Others reported wearing their 
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best clothing when they reported to the assembly centers, as if to show that they were 
deserving of the respect of which they had been robbed (Ellis & Smith, 2018).  
Once they arrived at assembly centers, Japanese families registered for removal 
and placed tags on their clothing and belongings (Ellis & Smith, 2018). They were then 
taken to temporary detention facilities, where they awaited transport to permanent 
internment camps. Many facilities were still being constructed, so some Japanese 
American families spent weeks or even months in temporary detention camps. County 
fairgrounds were common facilities for these temporary detention centers, and families 
were crowded into horse stalls and cowsheds for months at a time (National Archives, 
2017). While they waited, military-style camps were constructed in remote, rural areas of 
California, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Arkansas, and Colorado. Internees were 
eventually transported to internment camps by train. Once they arrived, the Japanese 
American prisoners tried to settle into some sort of normal routine. However, with four to 
five families living together in one barrack, and work and school habits virtually 
nonexistent, normalcy proved to be difficult.  
Despite the hardships they faced, Japanese American prisoners living in 
internment camps made the best of their situations. They planted gardens, built facilities 
such as schools and stores, held wedding ceremonies, and published camp newspapers 
(Ellis & Smith, 2018). Japanese American men also volunteered to serve in the American 
armed forces in disproportionately large numbers. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team 
(RCT) was a segregated unit comprised almost entirely of Japanese American men, and 
ultimately became the most decorated unit in U.S. Military history given its size and 
average length of service (Odo, 2015). The 442nd RCT suffered heavy casualties, losing 
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at least 800 men within just one year (Odo, 2015). Although their lives were full of 
suffering and loss, Japanese Americans displayed remarkable endurance and courage 
throughout World War II.  
Gaman (我慢) is a Japanese term that means “the display of calm forbearance 
and poise in the face of adverse circumstances beyond one’s control” (Dunn, 2006). For 
the 120,000 Japanese Americans who lived in prison camps during World War II, life 
was extremely difficult. However, despite the great injustices done to them by their 







“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not 
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny”  
Majority Opinion, Korematsu v. United States, 1944. 
Hirabayashi & Yasui (1943) 
 
Minoru Yasui and Gordon Hirabayashi were the first to challenge the 
government’s actions against Japanese Americans during World War II. Minoru Yasui 
walked into a police station at 11:20 P.M. on March 28, 1942 to test the constitutionality 
of the curfew order (Irons, 1983). He was found guilty of violating a military order and 
sentenced to serve one year in jail and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. Gordon Hirabayashi, 
a student at the University of Washington, was arrested on May 16, 1942 for violating the 
curfew order. Hirabayashi was also found guilty of violating a military order and ordered 
to serve two concurrent ninety-day sentences.  
After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear their cases, Yasui and 
Hirabayashi appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari 
on both cases. Hirabayashi and Yasui argued that the curfew order was issued through an 
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power. They also claimed that the 
curfew order “unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and 
those of other ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment” (Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 1943). The Court ultimately wrote a lengthy decision in Hirabayashi to address 
both cases.  
In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld Hirabayashi and Yasui’s convictions. 
Chief Justice Stone authored the majority opinion, while Justices Rutledge, Douglas, and 
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Murphy wrote separate concurring opinions. The Court rejected Hirabayashi’s contention 
that the curfew order was issued through an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s 
legislative power. After President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, it was ratified 
and confirmed by Congress. Consequently, the Court concluded that the government had 
the power to issue the curfew order.  
The Court also rejected Hirabayashi’s argument that the curfew violated the Fifth 
Amendment. When an individual claims that they have been denied due process of law, 
the government must show that the individual was provided with (1) notice that legal 
action was being taken against them, and (2) meaningful opportunity to participate or 
respond. Interestingly, Hirabayashi argued that the curfew order was in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment because it discriminated against Japanese Americans. The majority 
opinion asserted that the Fifth Amendment did not contain an equal protection clause, and 
therefore did not preclude the curfew order’s racial distinction. Ultimately, the majority 
found that the curfew order did not amount to a denial of procedural due process.  
While Justice Murphy agreed that the curfew order was within the Executive and 
Legislative powers of the government, he added several crucial points in his concurring 
opinion. Justice Murphy acknowledged that Congress and the Executive had the 
combined power to issue the curfew order, and also conceded that the curfew did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment. It was appropriate, Justice Murphy concluded, for the 
Military to bypass the standards of procedural due process given the severity of the 
situation on the West Coast. Justice Murphy stated:  
In view, however, of the critical military situation which prevailed on the 
Pacific Coast area in the spring of 1942, and the urgent necessity of taking 
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prompt and effective action to secure defense installations and military 
operations against the risk of sabotage and espionage, the military 
authorities should not be required to conform to standards of regulatory 
action appropriate to normal times (Hirayabashi v. United States, 1943).  
Although he ultimately concurred that the curfew order was issued legally in light of the 
extreme circumstances, Justice Murphy warned that a curfew based on a racial distinction 
went to “the very brink of Constitutional power” (Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943). In 
an instance of dictum, Justice Murphy added that although Japanese Americans residing 
on the West Coast could justifiably be subjected to a curfew, he asserted that they should 
not be prevented from leaving the area or moving freely within the country. In the end, 
Justice Murphy concluded that the curfew was constitutional, despite its risky and 
tenuous reliance on racial restrictions.  
Korematsu v. United States (1944) 
 
Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu born in Oakland, California to Japanese immigrant 
parents who owned a floral business (Fred T. Korematsu Institute). He volunteered to 
serve in the United States armed forces, but was rejected due to medical issues (Snyder, 
2009). By the time the U.S. entered World War II, Korematsu was working as a foreman 
in an Oakland shipyard. At twenty-three years old, Fred Korematsu decided that he 
would not abide by the relocation orders. He underwent minor plastic surgery to alter the 
appearance of his eyelids and took on a false name in an attempt to disguise his Japanese 
ancestry, while his friends and family packed their belongings and moved in internment 
camps (Fred T. Korematsu Institute). Although he managed to evade the authorities for 
several weeks, Fred Korematsu was eventually arrested on May 20, 1942.  
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While he awaited trial in the San Francisco County Jail, Korematsu was 
approached by the director of the regional American Civil Liberties Union office, Ernest 
Besig (Fred T. Korematsu Institute). Besig proposed that Korematsu question the 
constitutionality of the government’s actions against Japanese Americans by challenging 
his case to the United States Supreme Court. After he was convicted of violating 
DeWitt’s military order in Federal Court, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, 
Fred Korematsu appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari 
(Fred T. Korematsu Institute). When he later recounted his decision to challenge his 
conviction, Korematsu stated: “I didn't feel guilty because I didn't do anything wrong. 
Every day in school, we said the pledge to the flag, ‘with liberty and justice for all,’ and I 
believed all that. I was an American citizen, and I had as many rights as anyone else” 
(Goldstein, 2005). During the proceedings of the case, Korematsu lived at the Tonforan 
Assembly Center in San Bruno, California (Fred T. Korematsu Institute).  He and his 
family were later relocated to an internment camp in Topaz, Utah.  
The Court heard oral arguments for the Korematsu case in October 1944. 
Korematsu argued that the exclusion order violated his Fifth Amendment due process 
rights, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The case was 
decided by the Stone Court, which included six justices appointed by President Franklin 
Roosevelt. Hugo Black, who delivered the majority opinion, was once a member of the 
Ku Klux Klan (Rehnquist, 2000). Black’s majority opinion included Justices Reed, 
Douglas, Rutledge, and Chief Justice Stone. Justice Frankfurter concurred. Justices 
Murphy, Jackson, and Roberts dissented. 
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The exclusion order was subjected to review under an early form of the strict 
scrutiny standard. The standard states that in order for a law which applies to a suspect 
class to be considered Constitutional, the government must show that (1) a compelling 
state interest exists, and that (2) the law is wholly necessary or narrowly tailored to 
achieve the compelling state interest. The Court ultimately evaluated the exclusion order 
using the highest form of judicial review.  
Majority Opinion 
 
The Court ruled that the exclusion order was constitutional for several reasons. In 
the majority opinion, Justice Black concluded that the exclusion order was not based on 
racial prejudice, but rather military urgency. The majority rejected Korematsu’s claim 
that the exclusion order was unconstitutional on grounds of racial bias, and instead 
suggested that excluding Japanese Americans from their homes was necessary for the 
successful prosecution of war. Just as it did in Hirabayashi, the majority in Korematsu 
refused to strike the exclusion order because military authorities continuously insisted 
that it was a necessity. Ultimately, the Court insisted that the exclusion of Japanese 
Americans was an acceptable action in light of the ongoing war effort. 
Although the exclusion order was based on a racial distinction, the majority held 
that it was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The majority stated: 
“Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment 
of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice” (Korematsu v. 
United States, 1944). Instead, they insisted, the Court was tasked with assessing the 
constitutionality of an exclusion order, regardless of the “true nature” of the assembly 
centers. Excluding a racial group from a threatened area during wartime, the majority 
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contended, was constitutional. The majority went as far as declaring: “Korematsu was not 
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race” (Korematsu v. 
United States, 1944). Although the majority acknowledged that Japanese Americans were 
the sole targets of the exclusion order, they held that the military’s decision to remove 
them from their homes was not motivated by racial prejudice. 
Furthermore, the majority insisted that Korematsu did not have standing to 
challenge internment. In order to prove standing, a plaintiff must show (1) that they have 
been “injured”, or wronged, (2) that the injury is reasonably connected to the defendant’s 
conduct, and (3) that a court decision is likely to rectify the injury (US Legal, Inc.). The 
trial court found Korematsu guilty of failing to report to an assembly center, and he was 
jailed during the proceedings of his case before being sent to an internment camp. In light 
of these facts, the majority insisted that Korematsu did not have standing to challenge 
internment, since he had been convicted of failing to report to an assembly center, not an 
internment camp. The case’s syllabus included the following disclaimer: “The provisions 
of other orders requiring persons of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly centers and 
providing for the detention of such persons in assembly and relocation centers were 
separate, and their validity is not in issue in this proceeding” (Korematsu v. United States, 
1944).  
While the dissenting justices claimed that exclusion and internment were 
inseparable actions, the majority cited Blockburger v. United States to clarify that they 
did not intend on deciding the legality of Korematsu’s internment. Since DeWitt issued 
four separate public proclamations, and Korematsu was solely convicted of failing to 
report to an assembly center, the Court insisted that they could only issue a ruling on the 
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specific conviction at issue. The Court released their decision in Ex parte Endo on the 
same day as Korematsu v. United States. The Endo ruling addressed Mitsuye Endo’s 
internment, while the Korematsu decision focused on Fred Korematsu’s exclusion from 
his home.  
Dissenting Opinions 
 
While Hirabayashi v. United States was a unanimous ruling, Korematsu was a 
split 6-3 decision. Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson saw enough distinctions 
between the curfew and exclusion orders to dissent in Korematsu.  Justice Roberts 
pointed out that Korematsu was subjected to diametrically opposing orders, and therefore 
could not legally be punished for violating either. Justice Murphy’s dissent focused 
mainly on the exclusion order’s reliance on racial bias, and also included an assertion that 
the exclusion order was not narrowly tailored to the situation. Lastly, Justice Jackson 
insisted that asking a civilian court to sanction a military action would “weaponize” the 
statute by setting a precedent that any military commander could call upon to justify 
virtually any action. Although the Hirabayashi decision was unanimous, the Korematsu 
ruling ultimately divided the Court along ideological lines. 
Justice Roberts began his dissent in Korematsu by asserting there was an obvious 
difference between a curfew and the complete exclusion from one’s home. Unlike the 
majority, Justice Roberts insisted that forcing citizens to relocate based on a racial 
division was an unacceptable interpretation of military authority. Justice Roberts was the 
only Justice to refer to the relocation centers as “concentration camps”, a classification 
that the majority outright rejected. Justice Roberts also recited a detailed chronological 
sequence of events leading up to Korematsu’s arrest, and insisted that subjecting a citizen 
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to contradictory orders was a blatant violation of the Constitution. Finally, Justice 
Roberts rejected the majority’s assertion that Korematsu did not have standing to 
challenge his imprisonment in an internment camp. He criticized the majority for 
“erroneously dividing that which is single and indivisible” (Korematsu v. United States, 
1944). The Roberts dissent described Korematsu as an innocent man trapped between 
two diametrically opposing laws who simply wished to stay in his home but instead, had 
no choice but to submit himself to a concentration camp (Korematsu v. United States, 
1944).  
Justice Frank Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu v. United States is one of the most 
renowned judicial opinions in recent history. In light of Justice Murphy’s contention that 
the curfew order challenged in Hirabayashi “went to the very brink of Constitutional 
power”, he insisted that excluding citizens from their homes went far beyond a narrowly 
tailored means to protect national security during a war. Although it was heavily focused 
on the prevalence of racism in DeWitt’s actions, Justice Murphy’s dissent also outlined 
several other Constitutional issues within the exclusion order.  
Arguably the most crucial of Justice Murphy’s allegations was that the exclusion 
order was not narrowly tailored to achieving the compelling state interest. While he 
acknowledged that winning the war was a compelling state interest, Justice Murphy 
claimed that the internment order had “no reasonable relation to an ‘immediate, 
imminent, and impending’ public danger” (Korematsu v. United States, 1944). Although 
he found that a curfew was an appropriate and narrow application of the military’s 
authority, Justice Murphy contended that the exclusion order was not.     
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Justice Murphy’s dissent cited DeWitt’s Final Report on numerous occasions. 
Although the report was authored to show that the internment of Japanese Americans was 
a military necessity, Justice Murphy asserted that it merely proved that racism was the 
motivating force behind DeWitt’s actions. Justice Murphy asserted that that the 
Commanding General’s Final Report contained “no reliable evidence” to support its 
racist claims that all individuals of Japanese descent were inherently “subversive” and 
belonging to an “enemy race” (Korematsu v. United States, 1944). He also rejected the 
military’s assumption that Japanese individuals were more likely to engage in espionage 
or nefarious activities. Justice Murphy’s opinion was the first ever instance of the word 
“racism” in a Supreme Court decision. Ultimately, Justice Murphy condemned the 
Court’s ruling, proclaiming, “I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism” 
(Korematsu v. United States, 1944).  
Justice Jackson’s dissent rejected the majority’s suggestion that the Court was 
required to uphold any action that was deemed necessary by the military authorities. 
While the majority chose to defer to the wishes of the military given the urgency of the 
situation, Justice Jackson insisted that a civilian court could not be asked to interpret the 
Constitutionality of a military action. By doing so, he contended, the Court had validated 
the use of racial bias in criminal procedure. “The principle then lies about like a loaded 
weapon,” Jackson warned, “Ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in 
our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes” (Korematsu v. United States, 
1944). Justice Jackson maintained that the majority had erred by blindly deferring to the 
military and asserted that Korematsu’s conviction was unconstitutional.  
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The Korematsu decision shaped the strict scrutiny standard that the Court uses 
today to evaluate laws that touch upon suspect classifications such as race and national 
origin. Although it is considered the highest form of judicial review, the exclusion order 
ultimately passed the strict scrutiny test and was upheld by a majority of the Court. The 
terror and paranoia prompted by World War II ultimately led to the mass internment of 
over 120,000 Japanese Americans, despite the fact that no hard evidence existed to 
suggest that their presence on the West Coast created a danger to the nation. 
Unfortunately, documents such as the Final Report on Japanese Evacuation from the 
West Coast led the majority in Korematsu to the conclusion that an indeterminate number 
of Japanese Americans were disloyal and dangerous. Ultimately, the Court chose to 
concede to the military authorities and Executive branch’s assessment. When journaling 
about the Korematsu decision, Justice Frankfurter wrote that Justice Black began the 
Court’s private conference by stating: “Somebody must run this war. It is either 
Roosevelt or us. And we cannot” (Breyer, 2018).  
Ex parte Endo (1944) 
 
Mitsuye Endo was twenty-two years old when she was fired from her job at the 
Department of Motor Vehicles because of her Japanese ancestry (Niiya, 2018). She was 
eventually relocated to the Tule Lake internment camp, where she was approached by 
attorney James Purcell. Purcell asked Endo to serve as a plaintiff in a test case. Purcell 
allegedly selected Endo because she was born in the United States, had never been to 
Japan, was a practicing Christian, and had a brother in the U.S. Army (Niiya, 2018). With 
Purcell’s help, Mitsuye Endo filed a habeas corpus petition on July 12, 1942, in the 
federal district court of San Francisco (Niiya, 2018).  
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Habeas corpus is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process 
clause. A writ of habeas corpus may be filed by an imprisoned person to challenge the 
legality of their detention. When a writ of habeas corpus is filed, a custodian (such as a 
warden) must bring the imprisoned individual before the court (U.S. Marshalls Service). 
The court must then provide a reason for detaining the individual. The trial court judge 
denied her petition over a year later, and Endo appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The Appeals Court invoked certification to the Supreme Court, which heard oral 
arguments on October 12, 1944. The case was decided on the same day as Korematsu, 
December 18, 1944.  The Department of Justice and War Relocation Authority 
acknowledged that Endo was a law-abiding citizen and that she was not suspected of 
disloyalty. However, they held that removing classes of citizens was a rightful power of 
the military authorities during wartime. 
 In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court granted Mitsuye Endo’s petition for 
habeas corpus, and ordered that she be set free. However, the Court stopped short of 
addressing the constitutionality of Japanese internment, and instead focused on Endo’s 
detention specifically. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion, which stated: “We are 
of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that conclusion, 
we do not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been argued. For we 
conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain other 
classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its 
leave procedure” (Ex parte Endo, 1944).  
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The Court found that because Endo was a loyal, law-abiding citizen, she could not 
legally be detained. It was beyond the powers of the military, the Court held, to detain 
citizens who were indisputably loyal to the United States. Having been alerted of the 
Court’s finding in Endo, President Roosevelt issued Public Proclamation 21 the day prior 
to the Endo ruling, which rescinded the exclusion orders (Niiya, 2018). Mitsuye Endo, 
Fred Korematsu, and thousands of other Japanese Americans were released from 
internment camps in January 1945.  
 Ex parte Mitsuye Endo and Korematsu v. United States were decided by the Court 
on the same day. The two cases consist of similar disputes and invoke similar arguments. 
However, the Court’s decision in Korematsu could not be more different from their ruling 
in Endo. The two decisions are extremely difficult to reconcile due to their diametrically 
opposing logic. Korematsu and Endo were both ruled narrowly. Consequently, the Court 
has been criticized for refusing to address imperative constitutional issues that were 
invoked in both cases. The Court’s decision to discharge Mitsuye Endo is challenging to 
reconcile with its decision to affirm Fred Korematsu’s conviction. Ultimately, the 
Korematsu decision dealt only with the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West 
Coast, while the Endo ruling concerned their prolonged detention in the interior. The 
Court wrote in Korematsu that the exclusion of Japanese Americans from their homes 
and their internment were divisible from one another. Although the dissenters vehemently 






“I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination 
in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our 
democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any setting, but it is utterly 
revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in 
the Constitution of the United States” 
(Justice Murphy dissenting opinion, Korematsu v. United States, 1944).  
Aftermath  
Korematsu v. United States is widely regarded as one of the most disturbing 
rulings in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Although it has not aged well, 
Korematsu is a glimpse into history. The horrors and fear of World War II made many 
Americans, including high-ranking military officials and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces, take actions which are now unthinkable. For the thousands of Japanese 
Americans living on the West Coast of the U.S., the Korematsu decision was a blow that 
would last generations. After internment, many Japanese Americans returned to the West 
Coast, while others relocated further inland. Many survivors of internment chose not to 
speak openly about their experiences. San Francisco attorney Dale Minami said the 
following about his parent’s reaction to their internment:  
If you talk to any Sansei--third generation like myself--you will discover 
that we rarely heard our parents talk about the camp experience. I think they 
were profoundly ashamed by their experience, as if they must have done 
something wrong. They created a culture for their children to become 100% 
American and avoided questioning what the American government did to 
them (Minami, 2004).  
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In spite of this avoidance, a movement for redress began to gain speed during the 
late 1970’s. In 1980, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(CWRIC) was formed by Japanese American Congressmen Spark Matsunaga, Norman 
Mineta, and Robert Matsui (Yamoto, 2014). After hearing the testimonies of over 750 
survivors and witnesses, the commission released their recommendations in 1982 as a 
book titled Personal Justice Denied (Yamoto, 2014). The commission determined that 
the exclusion orders were “not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which 
followed from it—exclusion, detention, the ending of detention and the ending of 
exclusion—were not founded upon military conditions” (Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 1982). Ultimately, the commission recommended 
that Congress offer an official apology to the Japanese American people, that the 
President pardon those who were convicted of violating the internment orders, and that 
the survivors of internment be paid $20,000 each as compensation for their unjust 
imprisonment.  
On August 10, 1988, President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act into law 
(Yamoto, 2014). The act acknowledged that the actions committed against Japanese 
Americans during World War II “were carried out without adequate security reasons and 
without any acts of espionage or sabotage, and were motivated largely by racial 
prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership” (Yamoto, 2014). Once 
the act became law, each living survivor of Japanese internment was issued a check for 
$20,000 and given a formal presidential apology. The redress movement was an attempt 
to right the wrongs done to over 100,000 Japanese Americans during World War II.  
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Fred Korematsu’s case was reopened in 1983 when he filed a writ of coram nobis 
with the U.S. District Court of Northern California. During litigation, attorneys from the 
Justice Department offered Korematsu a full pardon if he would drop his lawsuit against 
the United States. Kathryn Korematsu, Fred Korematsu’s wife, responded to this offer by 
saying that her husband was not interested in a pardon from the government—and in fact, 
that the government should have sought a pardon from him and from Japanese Americans 
for the injustices committed against them (Fred Korematsu Institute). Fred Korematsu’s 
conviction was formally overturned by District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel in 1983.  
Although this decision was a momentous occasion for Fred Korematsu and the 
survivors of internment, the Supreme Court’s 1944 ruling still stands. The Court recently 
repudiated the Korematsu decision in their 2018 Trump v. Hawaii ruling, but in order for 
the Court to formally overturn Korematsu, a case of similar subject matter would have to 
come before them. The Korematsu decision was also limited to its facts, and therefore 
would not be considered binding precedent in the event that a similar case reached the 
Supreme Court. In light of this fact, the Court lacks a formal standard to test the 
constitutionality of a wartime racial exclusion order based on military necessity.  
The Future 
 
The Supreme Court limited the Korematsu decision to its facts, effectively 
stripping the decision of any precedential value to be applied in later similar 
situations.  Thus, the Constitutional limits to military wartime powers (if any exist at all) 
are unclear, primarily because the Supreme Court gives the Executive Branch a 
tremendous amount of deference as to the military's factual findings, assumed risks, and 
proposed solutions in wartime. 
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In January 2017, President Trump issued a series of Executive Orders temporarily 
banning the entry of individuals from eight foreign nations into the United States. The 
matter was immediately challenged in numerous trial courts. Several plaintiffs, including 
the state of Hawaii, filed suit in District Court against President Trump for violating the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Establishment Clause (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). 
The District Court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement 
of the restrictions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ultimately, the matter reached the 
Supreme Court when the Trump administration petitioned for review and the Court 
granted certiorari on January 19, 2018.  
 The judicial questions presented in Trump v. Hawaii were similar to those 
examined in Korematsu. The Court had to decide whether the President had the statutory 
authority to issue the Executive Order, and examined whether his action violated the 
Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs insisted that Trump’s executive order was aimed at 
blocking the entry of Muslims into the United States based upon campaign statements in 
which Trump insisted that he would enact a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States”. However, the Trump administration maintained that since 
many majority-Muslim countries were not subject to restrictions, the Executive Order did 
not violate the Establishment Clause (Trump v. Hawaii, n.d.).  
 The Court ruled in favor of Trump in a 5-4 decision. In the majority opinion, 
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act “vests the President with ‘ample power’ to impose entry restrictions” and that 
Trump’s Executive Order “falls well within this comprehensive delegation” (Trump v. 
Hawaii, 2018). The majority also rejected the accusation that the Executive Order 
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violated the Establishment Clause. According to the majority opinion authored by Chief 
Justice John Roberts, the Executive Order did not favor or disfavor any particular religion 
on its face. Since several majority-Muslim countries were not subjected to regulations, 
and many non-Muslim majority nations were in fact subjected to exclusion, the Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim. Ultimately, the Court refused to strike the Executive Order 
because the President felt it was necessary for national security purposes.  
The dissenting Justices in Trump v. Hawaii saw the Executive Order as an 
obvious instance of racial prejudice. Justice Ginsberg joined Justice Sotomayor’s 
scathing dissent in which she slammed the majority for failing to safeguard “the 
fundamental principle of religious neutrality in the First Amendment” (Trump v. Hawaii, 
2018). Justice Sotomayor also made a remarkable comparison between the Trump ruling 
and the Korematsu decision. She described the striking similarities between the two 
cases, noting that both Presidents Roosevelt and Trump implemented “sweeping 
exclusionary policies” based upon “ill-defined national security threats” (Trump v. 
Hawaii, 2018). Just as it did in Korematsu, the Court upheld President Trump’s 
Executive Order based on the dangerous assumption that national security must be 
preserved at any cost. Justice Sotomayor wrote: “By blindly accepting the Government’s 
misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a 
disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court 
redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one 
“gravely wrong” decision with another” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).  
Although Korematsu was limited to its facts, its legacy lives on within the heart of 
American jurisprudence. On December 8, 2015, then-candidate Trump stated that he was 
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“Calling, very simply, for a shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” (Liptak, 
2018). Although this statement was not particularly unique for the Trump campaign, the 
presidential hopeful went on to cite a historical event as justification. “Take a look at 
what F.D.R. did many years ago. He did the same thing. This is a President who was 
highly respected by all—they named highways after him” (Liptak, 2018). Despite the 
adamant warnings of Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson, the Court upheld yet 
another prejudicial exclusion order in Trump v. Hawaii. Although the Korematsu 
decision was recently repudiated by the Court and is widely considered a mistake, the 
horrors of legalized Japanese internment have not been forgotten, and will live on for as 
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